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PREFACE 
William Flesch, in his book Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic 
Punishment, and Other Biological Components of Fiction, theorizes that humans’ passion 
for fictional narratives emerges from a predilection for monitoring one another for signals 
of their capacity for cooperative relationships. Humans naturally favor conspecifics who 
prove themselves capable of setting aside their own rational self-interests to act on behalf 
of others or on behalf of the larger group to which they belong. At the same time, they 
demonstrate their own altruistic tendencies by favoring other altruists and punishing 
those who would take advantage of them. In his epic poem Paradise Lost, John Milton 
inadvertently created in Satan a captivating character who has won the favor of readers 
for generations. Does the character somehow signal to readers that he is altruistic? A 
similar, modern example of a supposedly bad character who nevertheless manages to win 
the admiration of readers is Tyler Durden from Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Fight Club. Is 
there some type of underlying message about cooperation in the seemingly senseless 
violence in this story?  
 Flesch leaves unexplored a dimension of evolutionary psychology which could 
provide some insight into the appeal of both Milton’s and Palahniuk’s stories. 
Anthropologist Christopher Boehm explores the human propensity toward forming 
hierarchies in his book Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. It 
turns out that, contrary to conventional wisdom, humans in foraging bands similar to 
those they have lived in for the vast majority of their time on earth are strictly egalitarian. 
Indeed, most contemporary hunter-gatherers would, with little prompting, express 
support for Satan’s famous line about it being better to reign in hell than serve in heaven. 
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They would also quite likely recognize many of the group dynamics Tyler Durden 
manipulates to gain ascendancy among the members of the fight clubs—as well as the 
ultimate necessity of having someone end his reign.  
 The theoretical foundation established by Flesch can likely support considerations 
of male competition for status—along with the social mechanisms that mitigate it—since 
one of the preconditions thought necessary for the evolution of cooperation among 
humans is a relative absence of hierarchical behavior. One common form of selfishness 
humans are vigilant of in their neighbors is a strong motivation to dominate others. When 
a person, or a fictional representation of one, acquires influence incommensurate with 
others in the group, those other group members can be counted on to pay close attention 
to the way that person yields his (or less often her) power. If it turns out to be for the 
benefit of the group, the higher-status individual will continue to have the support of the 
group’s members. If it is to further purely selfish interests, the lower-ranking group 
members will usually act collectively to bring an end to his dominance. This dynamic has 
been playing out in stories told by hunter-gatherers and writers in more complex societies 
alike since time immemorial. 
 This work explores the central characters of Paradise Lost and Fight Club in an 
attempt to illuminate readers’ feelings toward them. In particular, it will focus on 
Milton’s Satan and Palahniuk’s Tyler Durder, and will examine the way in which they 
are portrayed in search of recognizable signals of either selfishness or altruism. Such an 
exploration might also yield insights into how Boehm’s theories of human hierarchical or 
egalitarian proclivities can be integrated into the approach to literature set out by Flesch.  
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Introduction: 
Altruism and Narrative Interest 
 In a New York Times article published in the spring of 2010, psychologist Paul 
Bloom tells the story of a one-year-old boy’s remarkable response to a puppet show. The 
drama the puppets enacted began with a central character’s demonstration of a desire to 
play with a ball. After revealing that intention, the character roles the ball to a second 
character who likewise wants to play and so rolls the ball back to the first. When the first 
character rolls the ball to a third, however, this puppet snatches it up and quickly 
absconds. The second, nice puppet and the third, mean one are then placed before the 
boy, who’s been keenly attentive to their doings, and they both have placed before them a 
few treats. The boy is now instructed by one of the adults in the room to take a treat away 
from one of the puppets. Most children respond to the instructions by taking the treat 
away from the mean puppet, and this particular boy is no different. He’s not content with 
such a meager punishment, though, and after removing the treat he proceeds to reach out 
and smack the mean puppet on the head.  
 Brief stage shows like the one featuring the nice and naughty puppets are part of 
an ongoing research program lead by Karen Wynn, Bloom’s wife and colleague, and 
graduate student Kiley Hamlin at Yale University’s Infant Cognition Center. An earlier 
permutation of the study was featured on PBS’s Nova series The Human Spark, which 
shows host Alan Alda looking on as an infant named Jessica attends to a puppet show 
with the same script as the one that riled the boy Bloom describes. Jessica is so tiny that 
her ability to track and interpret the puppets’ behavior on any level is impressive, but 
when she demonstrates a rudimentary capacity for moral judgment by reaching with 
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unchecked joy for the nice puppet while barely glancing at the mean one, Alda—and 
Nova viewers along with him—can’t help but demonstrate his own delight. Jessica shows 
unmistakable signs of positive emotion in response to the nice puppet’s behaviors, and 
Alda in turn feels positive emotions toward Jessica. Bloom attests that “if you watch the 
older babies during the experiments, they don’t act like impassive judges—they tend to 
smile and clap during good events and frown, shake their heads and look sad during the 
naughty events” (6). Any adult witnessing the children’s reactions can be counted on to 
mirror these expressions and to feel delight at the babies’ incredible precocity. 
 The setup for these experiments with children is very similar to experiments with 
adult participants that assess responses to anonymously witnessed exchanges. In their 
research report, “Third-Party Punishment and Social Norms,” Ernst Fehr and Urs 
Fischbacher describe a scenario inspired by economic game theory called the Dictator 
Game. It begins with an experimenter giving a first participant, or player, a sum of 
money. The experimenter then explains to this first player that he or she is to propose a 
cut of the money to a second player. In the Dictator Game—as opposed to other similar 
game theory scenarios—the second player has no choice but to accept the cut from the 
first player, the dictator. The catch is that the exchange is being witnessed by a third 
party, the analogue of little Jessica or the head-slapping avenger in the Yale experiments.  
This third player is then given the opportunity to reward or punish the dictator. As Fehr 
and Fischbacher explain, “Punishment is, however, costly for the third party so a selfish 
third party will never punish” (3).  
It turns out, though, that adults, just like the infants in the Yale studies, are not 
selfish—at least not entirely. Instead, they readily engage in indirect, or strong, 
3 
 
reciprocity. Evolutionary literary theorist William Flesch explains that “the strong 
reciprocator punishes and rewards others for their behavior toward any member of the 
social group, and not just or primarily for their interactions with the reciprocator” (21-2). 
According to Flesch, strong reciprocity is the key to solving what he calls “the puzzle of 
narrative interest,” the mystery of why humans so readily and eagerly feel “anxiety on 
behalf of and about the motives, actions, and experiences of fictional characters” (7). The 
human tendency toward strong reciprocity reaches beyond any third party witnessing an 
exchange between two others; as Alda, viewers of Nova, and even readers of Bloom’s 
article in the Times watch or read about Wynn and Hamlin’s experiments, they have no 
choice but to become participants in the experiments themselves, because their own 
tendency to reward good behavior with positive emotion and to punish bad behavior with 
negative emotion is automatically engaged. Audiences’ concern, however, is much less 
with the puppets’ behavior than with the infants’ responses to it.  
The studies of social and moral development conducted at the Infant Cognition 
Center pull at witnesses’ heartstrings because they demonstrate babies’ capacity to 
behave in a way that is expected of adults. If Jessica had failed to discern between the 
nice and the mean puppets, viewers probably would have readily forgiven her. When 
older people fail to make moral distinctions, however, those in a position to witness and 
appreciate that failure can be counted on to withdraw their favor—and may even engage 
in some type of sanctioning, beginning with unflattering gossip and becoming more 
severe if the immorality or moral complacency persists. Strong reciprocity opens the way 
for endlessly branching nth-order reciprocation, so not only will individuals be considered 
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culpable for offenses they commit but also for offenses they passively witness. Flesch 
explains, 
Among the kinds of behavior that we monitor through tracking or through report, 
and that we have a tendency to punish or reward, is the way others monitor 
behavior through tracking or through report, and the way they manifest a 
tendency to punish and reward. (50) 
 
Failing to signal disapproval makes witnesses complicit. On the other hand, signaling 
favor toward individuals who behave altruistically simultaneously signals to others the 
altruism of the signaler. What’s important to note about this sort of indirect signaling is 
that it does not necessarily require the original offense or benevolent act to have actually 
occurred. People take a proclivity to favor the altruistic as evidence of altruism—even if 
the altruistic character is fictional.  
That infants less than a year old respond to unfair or selfish behavior with 
negative emotions—and a readiness to punish—suggests that strong reciprocity has deep 
evolutionary roots in the human lineage. Humans’ profound emotional engagement with 
fictional characters and fictional exchanges probably derives from a long history of 
adapting to challenges whose Darwinian ramifications were far more serious than any 
attempt to while away some idle afternoons. Game theorists and evolutionary 
anthropologists have a good idea what those challenges might have been: for 
cooperativeness or altruism to be established and maintained as a norm within a group of 
conspecifics, some mechanism must be in place to prevent the exploitation of cooperative 
or altruistic individuals by selfish and devious ones. Flesch explains, 
Darwin himself had proposed a way for altruism to evolve through the mechanism 
of group selection. Groups with altruists do better as a group than groups without. 
But it was shown in the 1960s that, in fact, such groups would be too easily 
infiltrated or invaded by nonaltruists—that is, that group boundaries are too 
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porous—to make group selection strong enough to overcome competition at the 
level of the individual or the gene. (5)  
 
If, however, individuals given to trying to take advantage of cooperative norms were 
reliably met with slaps on the head—or with ostracism in the wake of spreading gossip—
any benefits they (or their genes) might otherwise count on to redound from their selfish 
behavior would be much diminished. Flesch’s theory is “that we have explicitly evolved 
the ability and desire to track others and to learn their stories precisely in order to punish 
the guilty (and somewhat secondarily to reward the virtuous)” (21). Before strong 
reciprocity was driving humans to bookstores, amphitheaters, and cinemas, then, it was 
serving the life-and-death cause of ensuring group cohesion and sealing group boundaries 
against neighboring exploiters.   
Game theory experiments that have been conducted since the early 1980s have 
consistently shown that people are willing, even eager to punish others whose behavior 
strikes them as unfair or exploitative, even when administering that punishment involves 
incurring some cost for the punisher. Like the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game 
involves two people, one of whom is given a sum of money and told to offer the other 
participant a cut. The catch in this scenario is that the second player must accept the cut 
or neither player gets to keep any money. “It is irrational for the responder not to accept 
any proposed split from the proposer,” Flesch writes. “The responder will always come 
out better by accepting than vetoing” (31). What the researchers discovered, though, was 
that a line exists beneath which responders will almost always refuse the cut. “This 
means they are paying to punish,” Flesch explains. “They are giving up a sure gain in 
order to punish the selfishness of the proposer” (31). Game theorists call this behavior 
altruistic punishment because “the punisher’s willingness to pay this cost may be an 
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important part in enforcing norms of fairness” (31). In other words, the punisher is 
incurring a cost to him or herself in order to ensure that selfish actors don’t have a chance 
to get a foothold in the larger, cooperative group.  
The economic logic notwithstanding, it seems natural to most people that second 
players in Ultimatum Game experiments should signal their disapproval—or stand up for 
themselves, as it were—by refusing to accept insultingly meager proposals. The cost of 
the punishment, moreover, can be seen as a symbol of various other types of 
considerations that might prevent a participant or a witness from stepping up or stepping 
in to protest. Discussing the Three-Player Dictator Game experiments conducted by Fehr 
and Fischbacher, Flesch points out that strong reciprocity is even more starkly contrary to 
any selfish accounting: 
Note that the third player gets nothing out of paying to reward or punish except 
the power or agency to do just that. It is highly irrational for this player to pay to 
reward or punish, but again considerations of fairness trump rational self-interest. 
People do pay, and pay a substantial amount, when they think that someone has 
been treated notably unfairly, or when they think someone has evinced marked 
generosity, to affect what they have observed. (33) 
 
Neuroscientists have even zeroed in on the brain regions that correspond to our 
suppression of immediate self-interest in the service of altruistic punishment, as well as 
those responsible for the pleasure we take in anticipating—though not in actually 
witnessing—free riders meeting with their just deserts (Knoch et al. 829; Quevain et al. 
1254). Outside of laboratories, though, the cost punishers incur can range from the risks 
associated with a physical confrontation to time and energy spent convincing skeptical 
peers a crime has indeed been committed.  
Flesch lays out his theory of narrative interest in a book aptly titled 
Comeuppance: Costly Signaling, Altruistic Punishment, and Other Biological 
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Components of Fiction. A cursory survey of mainstream fiction, in both blockbuster 
movies and best-selling novels, reveals the good guys versus bad guys dynamic as 
preeminent in nearly every plot, and much of the pleasure people get from the most 
popular narratives can quite plausibly be said to derive from the goodie prevailing—after 
a long, harrowing series of close calls and setbacks—while the baddie simultaneously 
gets his or her comeuppance. Audiences love to see characters get their just deserts. 
When the plot fails to deliver on this score, they walk away severely disturbed. That 
disturbance can, however, serve the author’s purposes, particularly when the goal is to 
bring some danger or injustice to readers’ or viewers’ attention, as in the case of novels 
like Orwell’s 1984.  
Plots, of course, seldom feature simple exchanges with meager stakes on the scale 
of game theory experiments, and heroes can by no means count on making it to the final 
scene both vindicated and rewarded—even in stories designed to give audiences exactly 
what they want. The ultimate act of altruistic punishment, and hence the most 
emotionally poignant behavior a character can engage in, is martyrdom. It’s no 
coincidence that the hero dies in the act of vanquishing the villain in so many of the most 
memorable books and movies. 
If narrative interest really does emerge from a propensity to monitor each other’s 
behaviors for signs of a capacity for cooperation and to volunteer affect on behalf of 
altruistic individuals and against selfish ones they want to see get their comeuppance, the 
strong appeal of certain seemingly bad characters emerges as a mystery calling for 
explanation.  From England’s tradition of Byronic heroes like Rochester to America’s 
fascination with bad boys like Tom Sawyer, these characters win over audiences and 
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stand out as perennial favorites, even though at first blush they seem anything but eager 
to establish their nice guy bone fides. On the other hand, Rochester was eventually 
redeemed in Jane Eyre, and Tom Sawyer, though naughty to be sure, shows no sign 
whatsoever of being malicious. Tellingly, though, these characters, and a long list of 
others like them, also demonstrate a remarkable degree of cleverness: Rochester passing 
for a gypsy woman, for instance, or Tom Sawyer making fence painting out to be a 
privilege. One hypothesis that could account for the appeal of bad boys is that their 
badness demonstrates undeniably their ability to escape the negative consequences most 
people expect to result from their own bad behavior.  
This type of demonstration likely functions in a way similar to another 
mechanism that many evolutionary biologists theorize must have been operating for 
cooperation to have become established in human societies, a process referred to as the 
handicap principle, or costly signaling. A lone altruist in any group is unlikely to fare 
well in terms of survival and reproduction. So the question arises as to how the minimum 
threshold of cooperators in a population was first surmounted. Flesch’s fellow 
evolutionary critic, Brian Boyd, in his book On the Origin of Stories, traces the process 
along a path from mutualism, or coincidental mutual benefits, to inclusive fitness, 
whereby organisms help others who are likely to share their genes—primarily family 
members—to reciprocal altruism, a quid pro quo arrangement in which one organism will 
aid another in anticipation of some future repayment (54-57). However, a few individuals 
in our human ancestry must have benefited from altruism that went beyond familial 
favoritism and tit-for-tat bartering.  
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In their classic book The Handicap Principal, Amotz and Avishag Zahavi suggest 
that altruism serves a function in cooperative species similar to the one served by a 
peacock’s feathers. The principle could also help account for the appeal of human 
individuals who routinely risk suffering consequences which deter most others. The idea 
is that conspecifics have much to gain from accurate assessments of each other’s fitness 
when choosing mates or allies. Many species have thus evolved methods for honestly 
signaling their fitness, and as the Zahavis explain, “in order to be effective, signals have 
to be reliable; in order to be reliable, signals have to be costly” (xiv). Peacocks, the iconic 
examples of the principle in action, signal their fitness with cumbersome plumage 
because their ability to survive in spite of the handicap serves as a guarantee of their 
strength and resourcefulness. Flesch and Boyd, inspired by evolutionary anthropologists, 
find in this theory of costly signaling the solution the mystery of how altruism first 
became established; human altruism is, if anything, even more elaborate than the 
peacock’s display.  
Humans display their fitness in many ways. Not everyone can be expected to have 
the wherewithal to punish free-riders, especially when doing so involves physical 
conflict. The paradoxical result is that humans compete for the status of best cooperator 
because altruism is a costly signal of fitness. Flesch explains how this competition could 
have emerged in human populations: 
If there is a lot of between-group competition, then those groups whose modes of 
costly signaling take the form of strong reciprocity, especially altruistic 
punishment, will outcompete those whose modes yield less secondary gain, 
especially less secondary gain for the group as a whole. (57) 
 
Taken together, the evidence Flesch presents suggests the audiences of narratives 
volunteer affect on behalf of fictional characters who show themselves to be altruists and 
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against those who show themselves to be selfish actors or exploiters, experiencing both 
frustration and delight in the unfolding of the plot as they hope to see the altruists prevail 
and the free-riders get their comeuppance. Flesch points out that this theory illuminates 
the role of the storyteller as well: “The story tells a story of punishment; the story 
punishes as story; the storyteller represents him- or herself as an altruistic punisher by 
telling it” (83). This capacity for emotional engagement with fiction likely evolved 
because it also serves as a signal to anyone monitoring individuals as they read or view 
the story, or as they discuss it later, that they are disposed either toward altruistic 
punishment or toward third-order free-riding themselves—and altruism is a costly signal 
of fitness. 
The hypothesis emerging from this theory of social monitoring and volunteered 
affect to explain the appeal of bad boy characters is that their bad behavior will tend to 
redound to the detriment of still worse characters. Bloom describes the results of another 
series of experiments (Hamlin et al. 19931) with eight-month-old participants: 
When the target of the action was itself a good guy, babies preferred the puppet 
who was nice to it. This alone wasn’t very surprising, given that the other studies 
found an overall preference among babies for those who act nicely. What was 
more interesting was what happened when they watched the bad guy being 
rewarded or punished. Here they chose the punisher. Despite their overall 
preference for good actors over bad, then, babies are drawn to bad actors when 
those actors are punishing bad behavior. (5) 
 
These characters’ bad behavior will also likely serve an obvious function as costly 
signaling; they’re bad because they’re good at getting away with it. Evidence that the bad 
boy characters are somehow truly malicious—for instance, clear signals of a wish to 
harm innocent characters—or that they’re irredeemably antisocial would severely 
undermine the theory.  
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 The spectrum of adult male behavior from purely selfish to purely altruistic 
extends into domains that would be difficult to capture in experiments with infant boys 
and girls. Anthropologist Christopher Boehm has written an indispensable ethnological 
examination of every group of nomadic hunter-gathers that have been studied. In his 
book, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior, he adds another 
important piece to the puzzle of human altruism and strong reciprocity. Based on the 
remarkable finding that “A distinctly egalitarian political style is highly predictable 
wherever people live in small, locally autonomous social and economic groups” (36), at 
least among the men, whom he observes tend to be the “main political actors” (5), Boehm 
theorizes that political and economic parity among men and households was what made 
the evolution of altruistic punishment and general selflessness possible. He posits that  
the advent of egalitarianism shifted the balance of forces within natural selection 
so that within-group selection was substantially debilitated and between-group 
selection was amplified. At the same time, egalitarian moral communities found 
themselves uniquely positioned to suppress free-riding…at the level of the 
phenotype. With respect to the natural selection of behavior genes, this 
mechanical formula clearly favors the retention of altruistic traits. (199) 
 
This theory narrows the scope for what behaviors audiences of fiction can be expected to 
be particularly vigilant of. In a pleasing synthesis of evolutionary modeling, 
psychological experiments, real-world anthropological observations, and literary theory, 
Boehm places the role of narrative at the heart of the egalitarian ethos:  
As practical political philosophers, foragers perceive quite correctly that self-
aggrandizement and individual authority are threats to personal autonomy. When 
upstarts try to make inroads against an egalitarian social order, they will be 
quickly recognized and, in many cases, quickly curbed on a preemptive basis. 
One reason for this sensitivity is that the oral tradition of a band (which includes 
knowledge from adjacent bands) will preserve stories about serious domination 
episodes. (87) 
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As the first step toward a preliminary survey, the following sections examine two 
infamous instances in which literary characters whose creators intended audiences to 
recognize as bad nonetheless managed to steal the show from the supposed good guys. 
The obvious candidate to be considered first in the history of literary bad boys is Satan 
from Milton’s epic poem Paradise Lost. In an essay written in the early in the 1790s, a 
hundred and twenty years after the publication of Milton’s masterpiece, William Blake 
suggests, “The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels and God, and at 
liberty when of Devils and Hell, is because he was a true Poet and of the Devil’s party 
without knowing it.” Milton’s Satan was in fact the inspiration for the original Byronic 
heroes, as Lord Byron himself was quite impressed by the character.  
There is today no shortage of renowned bad boy characters in popular culture—
Tony Soprano, Jack Sparrow, Don Draper, Gregory House, to name just a few—but none 
has sparked quite as much controversy among literary and cultural critics as Tyler 
Durden from Chuck Palahniuk’s 1996 novel Fight Club and the 1999 film version 
directed by David Fincher. Responding to critic Henry Giroux’s charge that the story and 
its characters are “morally bankrupt,” Jesse Kavadlo, even as he attempts to defend 
Palahniuk, has to admit that, “More unsettling than Giroux’s academic denunciation is 
the popular readership that identifies too strongly with Tyler Durden” (11). 
Flesch’s theory of narrative interest offers two hypotheses to consider in 
examining the characters of Satan and Tyler Durden: the first is that their bad behavior 
will take the form of costly signaling or altruistic punishment; the second is that there 
will be one or more other characters whose behavior is worse—more clearly selfish or 
antisocial—than the behavior of the bad boy himself, and it will be this character or 
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characters at whom the bad boy’s bad behavior is directed. Boehm’s theories on the 
natural human tendency to protect individual autonomy from dominating leaders provides 
a third, refining hypothesis: the selfish behavior the bad boys’ bad behavior is intended to 
punish will often take the form of an abuse of power.  
Part 1 
The Satanic Spring 
In Edward P. Jones’ 2003 Pulitzer-winning novel The Known World, the aging 
black teacher Fern Elston tells a pamphleteer researching the life of a freed slave named 
Henry Townsend, who went on to become a slave-owner himself, about some of the 
books that had intrigued her former student. “Do you know Milton, Mr. Frazier?” she 
asks. “Do you know Paradise Lost, Mr. Frazier?” The pamphleteer says he does know 
Milton and Paradise Lost. She responds, 
So did Henry. “Ain’t that a thing to say” is what he said of the Devil who 
proclaimed that he would rather rule in hell than serve in heaven. He thought only 
a man who knew himself well could say such a thing, could turn his back on God 
with just finality. I tried to make him see what a horrible choice that was, but 
Henry had made up his mind about that and I could not turn him back. He loved 
Milton. (134-5) 
 
In having his character come away from Paradise Lost with a keen admiration for Satan, 
to his teacher’s consternation, Jones was representing a long tradition of controversy over 
Milton’s anti-hero. This is the character who rebels against God, whose temptation of 
Adam and Eve loosed on humanity the torments of Sin and Death, and who Christ had to 
suffer and die to vanquish. Even readers willing to admit Satan cuts an impressive figure 
and makes a few good points in his arguments surely feel a tinge of panic every time they 
catch themselves nodding along with his declamations or feel their gooseflesh rising at 
his rousing calls to arm. 
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Customarily, Milton is pardoned for inadvertently lending sympathetic 
dimensions to the character of the Arch Fiend with reference to his presumed confusion 
about his true subject matter. The year 1649 saw the execution of King Charles I, a 
punishment Milton defended in his prose writing. Under Charles, the Church of England 
had become too rigidly hierarchical and dogmatic. So, when Milton has Satan righteously 
challenge the absolute rule of God, many readers assume the sentiments are simply 
misdirected. An accounting of what exactly Milton has his anti-hero do and say that 
makes him both sympathetic and admirable, however, will likely aid in any attempt at 
understanding how strong reciprocity functions to rouse the emotions of readers and how 
that process sometimes results in their favoring the nominal bad guy.  
Milton believed Christianity more than worthy of a poetic canon in the tradition 
of the classical poets, and Paradise Lost represents his effort at establishing one. What 
his Christian epic has offered for many readers over the centuries, however, is an 
invitation to weigh the actions and motivations of immortals in mortal terms. In the story, 
God becomes a human king, albeit one with superhuman powers, while Satan becomes 
an upstart subject. As Milton sets out to “justify the ways of God to men,” he is taking it 
upon himself simultaneously, and inadvertently, to justify the absolute dominion of a 
human dictator. One of the consequences of this shift in perspective is the transformation 
of a philosophical tradition devoted to parsing the logic of biblical teachings into 
something akin to a political campaign between two rival leaders, each laying out his 
respective platform alongside a case against his rival. What was hitherto recondite and 
academic becomes in Milton’s work immediate and visceral. 
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Christopher Boehm’s analysis of hunter-gather political behavior provides an 
ideal foundation for any discussion of strong reciprocity and human psychological 
reactions to selfishness and altruism in the context of hierarchical relations even when the 
society in question is much larger and more complex than those of nomadic foragers. He 
explains, 
We need not limit our analysis to egalitarians who live in bands or tribes, for we 
have seen that a universal political dilemma is abuse of power. Egalitarians may 
define it on a hair-trigger basis, whereas in a hierarchical chiefdom people expect 
their leader to throw his weight around to a moderate degree. Even in a highly 
despotic primitive kingdom, where the leader rules by coercive force, the 
boundary between legitimate and illegitimate use of power continues to be 
defined by public opinion. There, however, psychological ambivalences about 
abuse of power may remain permanently unresolved: the rank and file may 
quietly complain about a tyrant’s behavior even as fear of his loyal soldiers keeps 
them from active rebellion. (241) 
 
Paradise Lost is a story about punishment, first Satan’s and then Man’s. If, however, 
Satan’s revolt against God is justified by God’s tyrannical behavior, then Satan could 
thus be seen as an altruistic punisher, as he risks taking on God’s “loyal soldiers.” What 
Flesch describes as “a fundamental aspect of plot” is at the center of the conflict between 
these two characters: “the conflict between true and false vindication, that is, the conflict 
between laudable vindication and the blameworthy vindictiveness it doubles and 
confounds” (163). Readers of Milton’s poems are faced with the task of deciding whether 
God or Satan is the one who is truly vindicated, the one whose violence truly represents 
altruistic punishment. 
Keats famously penned the wonderfully self-proving postulate, “Axioms in 
philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses,” which leaves open the 
question of how an axiom might be so proved. Milton’s God responds to Satan’s 
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approach to Earth, and his foreknowledge of Satan’s success in tempting the original pair, 
with a preemptive defense of his preordained punishment of Man:  
…Whose fault? 
Whose but his own? Ingrate! He had of Me 
All he could have. I made him just and right, 
Sufficient to have stood though free to fall. 
Such I created all th’ ethereal pow’rs 
And spirits, both them who stood and who failed: 
Freely they stood who stood and fell who fell. 
Not free, what proof could they have giv’n sincere 
Of true allegiance, constant faith or love 
Where only what they needs must do appeared, 
Not what they would? What praise could they receive? 
What pleasure I from such obedience paid 
When will and reason… had served necessity, 
Not me? (3.96-111) 
God is defending himself against the charge that his foreknowledge of the fall implies 
that Man’s decision to disobey was borne of something other than his free will. What 
choice could there have been if the outcome of Satan’s temptation was predetermined? If 
it wasn’t predetermined, how could God know what the outcome would be in advance? 
God’s answer—of course I granted humans free will because otherwise their obedience 
would mean nothing—only introduces further doubt. Now, readers must wonder why 
God so fervently relishes Man’s obedience.  
Is God hungry for political power? If readers conclude that he is—and that 
conclusion seems eminently warranted—then they find themselves on the side of Satan. 
“Bands,” Boehm writes, “are moral communities that agree on their values and, as a 
latent but potent political coalition, are always poised to manipulate or suppress 
individual deviates.” Each culture implicitly codifies the rules by which political power is 
to be expressed or wielded, and everyone remains vigilant lest his individual freedom 
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come under threat from a leader maneuvering to achieve a position of clear dominance. 
“On their list of serious moral transgressions,” Boehm explains,  
hunter-gathers regularly proscribe the enactment of behavior that is politically 
overbearing. They are aiming at upstarts who threaten the autonomy of other 
group members, and upstartism takes various forms. An upstart may act the bully 
simply because he is disposed to dominate others, or he may become selfishly 
greedy when it is time to share meat, or he may want to make off with another 
man’s wife by threat or by force. He (or sometimes she) may also be a respected 
leader who suddenly begins to issue direct orders… An upstart may simply take 
on airs of superiority, or may aggressively put others down and thereby violate the 
group’s idea of how its main political actors should be treating one another. (43)  
 
It’s not God’s foreknowledge of Man’s fall that undermines human freedom; it’s God’s 
insistence on our obedience, under threat of God’s terrible punishment.  
 Milton faces a still greater challenge in his attempt to justify God’s ways “upon 
our pulses” when it comes to the fallout of Man’s original act of disobedience. The Son 
argues on behalf of Man, pointing out that the original sin was brought about through 
temptation. If God responds by turning against Man, then Satan wins. The Son thus 
argues that God must do something to thwart Satan: “Or shall the Adversary thus obtain/ 
His end and frustrate Thine?” (3.156-7) Before laying out his plan for Man’s redemption, 
God explains why punishment is necessary: 
   …Man disobeying 
 Disloyal breaks his fealty and sins 
 Against the high supremacy of Heav’n, 
 Affecting godhead, and so, losing all, 
 To expiate his treason hath naught left 
 But to destruction sacred and devote 
 He with his whole posterity must die. (3. 203-9) 
The potential contradiction between foreknowledge and free choice may be abstruse 
enough for Milton’s character to convincingly discount: “If I foreknew/ Foreknowledge 
had no influence on their fault/ Which had no less proved certain unforeknown” (3.116-
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9). There is another contradiction, however, that Milton neglects to take on. If Man is 
“Sufficient to have stood though free to fall,” then God must justify his decision to punish 
the “whole posterity” as opposed to the individuals who choose to disobey. The Son 
agrees to redeem all of humanity for the offense committed by the original pair. His 
knowledge that every last human will disobey may not be logically incompatible with 
their freedom to choose; if every last human does disobey, however, the case for that 
freedom is severely undermined. The axiom of collective guilt precludes the axiom of 
freedom of choice both logically and upon our pulses.  
 In characterizing disobedience as a sin worthy of severe punishment—banishment 
from paradise, shame, toil, death—an offense he can generously expiate for Man by 
sacrificing the (his) Son, God attempts to justify his dominion by pronouncing 
disobedience toward himself evil, allowing him to claim that Man’s evil made it 
necessary for him to suffer a profound loss, the death of his offspring. In place of a 
justification for his rule, then, God resorts to a simple guilt trip.  
 Man shall not quite be lost but saved who will, 
 Yet not of will in him but grace in me 
 Freely vouchsafed. Once more I will renew 
 His lapsed pow’rs though forfeit and enthralled 
 By sin to foul exorbitant desires. 
 Upheld by me, yet once more he shall stand 
 On even ground against his mortal foe, 
 By me upheld that he may know how frail 
 His fall’n condition is and to me owe 
 All his deliv’rance, and to none but me. (3.173-83) 
Having decided to take on the burden of repairing the damage wrought by Man’s 
disobedience to him, God explains his plan:  
 Die he or justice must, unless for him 
 Some other as able and as willing pay 
 The rigid satisfaction, death for death. (3.210-3) 
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He then asks for a volunteer. In an echo of an earlier episode in the poem which has 
Satan asking for a volunteer to leave hell on a mission of exploration, there is a moment 
of hesitation before the Son offers himself up to die on Man’s behalf.  
 …On Me let thine anger fall. 
 Account Me Man. I for his sake will leave 
 Thy bosom and this glory next to Thee 
 Freely put off and for him lastly die 
 Well pleased. On Me let Death wreck all his rage! (3.37-42) 
This great sacrifice, which is supposed to be the basis of the Son’s privileged status over 
the angels, is immediately undermined because he knows he won’t stay dead for long: 
“Yet that debt paid/ Thou wilt not leave me in the loathsome grave” (246-7). The Son 
will only die momentarily. This sacrifice doesn’t stack up well against the real risks and 
sacrifices made by Satan.  
 All the poetry about obedience and freedom and debt never takes on the central 
question Satan’s rebellion forces readers to ponder: Does God deserve our obedience? Or 
are the labels of good and evil applied arbitrarily? The original pair was forbidden from 
eating from the Tree of Knowledge—could they possibly have been right to contravene 
the interdiction? Since it is God being discussed, however, the assumption that his 
dominion requires no justification, that it is instead simply in the nature of things, might 
prevail among some readers, as it does for the angels who refuse to join Satan’s rebellion. 
The angels, after all, owe their very existence to God, as Abdiel insists to Satan. Who, 
then, are any of them to question his authority? This argument sets the stage for Satan’s 
remarkable rebuttal:  
    …Strange point and new! 
Doctrine which we would know whence learnt: who saw 
When this creation was? Remember’st thou 
Thy making while the Maker gave thee being? 
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We know no time when we were not as now, 
Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised 
By our own quick’ning power… 
Our puissance is our own. Our own right hand 
Shall teach us highest deeds by proof to try 
Who is our equal. (5.855-66) 
Just as a pharaoh could claim credit for all the monuments and infrastructure he had 
commissioned the construction of, any king or dictator might try to convince his subjects 
that his deeds far exceed what he is truly capable of. If there’s no record and no 
witness—or if the records have been doctored and the witnesses silenced—the subjects 
have to take the king’s word for it.  
 That God’s dominion depends on some natural order, which he himself 
presumably put in place, makes his tendency to protect knowledge deeply suspicious. 
Even the angels ultimately have to take God’s claims to have created the universe and 
them along with it solely on faith. Because that same unquestioning faith is precisely 
what Satan and the readers of Paradise Lost are seeking a justification for, they could be 
forgiven for finding Milton’s answer tautological and unsatisfying. It is the Tree of 
Knowledge of Good and Evil that Adam and Eve are forbidden to eat fruit from. When 
Adam, after hearing Raphael’s recounting of the war in heaven, asks the angel how the 
earth was created, he does receive an answer, but only after a suspicious preamble: 
  …such commission from above 
 I have received to answer thy desire 
 Of knowledge within bounds. Beyond abstain 
 To ask nor let thine own inventions hope 
 Things not revealed which the invisible King 
 Only omniscient hath suppressed in night, 
 To none communicable in Earth or Heaven: 
 Enough is left besides to search and know. (7.118-125) 
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Raphael goes on to compare knowledge to food, suggesting that excessively indulging 
curiosity is unhealthy. This proscription of knowledge reminded Shelley of the 
Prometheus myth. It might remind modern readers of The Wizard of Oz—“Pay no 
attention to that man behind the curtain”—or to the space monkeys in Fight Club, who 
repeatedly remind audiences that “The first rule of Project Mayhem is, you do not ask 
questions.” It may also resonate with news about dictators in Asia or the Middle East 
trying desperately to keep social media outlets from spreading word of their atrocities.  
 Like the protesters of the Arab Spring, Satan is putting himself at great risk by 
challenging God’s authority. If God’s dominion over Man and the angels is evidence not 
of his benevolence but of his supreme selfishness, then Satan’s rebellion does indeed 
become a heroic attempt at altruistic punishment. Interestingly, William Flesch, long 
before beginning his research into the evolution of cooperation in humans, devoted a 
chapter of his book Generosity and the Limits of Authority to the conflict between God 
and Satan. The chapter, titled “The Majesty of Darkness,” points out that what originally 
incites Satan to rebellion is the issuing of a decree from God that all the angels are to 
worship the Son. “But God,” Flesch writes, “does not give Satan any persuasive reason 
for the law proclaiming the Son’s glorification” (238). As Satan says to his fellow angels, 
  …by Decree 
 Another now hath to himself ingross’t 
 All Power, and us eclipst under the name 
 Of King anointed. (5.774-7) 
Flesch attributes Satan’s grandeur to “his desire for liberty,” but he finds sufficient cause 
in the poem to justify the anti-hero’s fall. He writes, 
His superiority to his conception of God may consist in his perseverance “in some 
purpose which he has conceived to be excellent, in spite of adversity and torture,” 
as Shelley put it in his “Defense of Poetry,” but it is not at all clear how excellent 
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his purpose is. Empson and Bloom see Paradise Lost as chronicling Milton’s 
struggle with the nobility of his own conception of Satan, a struggle that forced 
him into debasing or “rotting” his own noble conception as Satan’s grandeur 
threatened to get out of hand. But Shelley’s analysis of Satan in the preface to 
Prometheus Unbound, that he is not “exempt from the taints of ambition, envy, 
revenge, and a desire for personal aggrandisement,” seems as true of Satan early 
(both in the poem and in the time frame) as later. (239) 
 
Here, Flesch is citing some of the major figures in the debate over how Milton’s poem is 
to be read, and he’s summarizing the main points in the case against Satan. 
Indeed, Satan poses a serious threat to the theory currently under consideration 
when he turns his wrath on Adam and Eve. If he harbors malice toward them—even if 
they are only indirect targets and the goal is to harm God—it would be difficult to 
convince anyone of his altruism. The critics Flesch cites have suggested that it was 
Milton’s trick all along to make Satan grand and seductive at first, only to heighten the 
dramatic effect of his degradation over the course of the plot. “Most critics are now 
agreed,” wrote William Empson in 1961,  
that there is a gradual calculated degradation of Satan, but this bit of 
understanding gets obscured by a hunger to argue that he is very bad from the 
start. The chief merit of the shape of the poem, I think, which has often been 
called magnificent architecture, is that it presents the change in Satan with such 
force. We first meet him certain of the righteousness of his cause though defeated, 
follow him into doubt and despair, switch back in the narrative of Raphael to find 
him confident that his cause will be victorious as well as just, then return to the 
story and find his character gradually rotting away. As there is no slip-up 
anywhere in this involved programme, we can be sure that it was intended. (71) 
 
For Empson, however, the degradation isn’t convincing because Satan’s transformation is 
understandable. At the same time he suggests, “one must also feel horror at the God who 
has deliberately reduced him to such a condition” (70). His continued sympathy for Satan 
stems largely from his capacity for “being struck ‘stupidly good’ when first confronted 
with Eve alone” (70). This scene occurs just before Satan finally tempts Eve. Even at this 
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point, when he is preparing to commit his great act of malice, he manages to be 
sympathetic owing to his ambivalence.  
Stanley Fish, in his book Surprised by Sin, places Empson in the same camp as 
Blake and Shelley, summarizing the position of the pro-Satan party to the effect that their 
candidate “rescues mankind from an unvarying routine of mindless genuflection and 
makes possible the glorious and distinctively human search for self-knowledge and 
knowledge of the Truth” (x). Fish goes on to make some grandiose claims of a sort that 
have made him infamous himself. 
By shifting the field where coherence was to be found from the words on the page 
to the experience they provoked, I was able to reconcile the two camps under the 
aegis of a single thesis: Paradise Lost is a poem about how its readers came to be 
the way they are; its method, ‘not so much a teaching as an intangling’ is to 
provoke in its readers wayward, fallen responses which are then corrected by one 
of the several authoritative voices (the narrator, God, Raphael, Michael, the Son). 
In this way, I argued, the reader is brought to a better understanding of his sinful 
nature and is encouraged to participate in his own reformation. (xi) 
 
Though the shift in focus from the text to the reader is helpful, Fish doesn’t really offer 
any psychological insight into why exactly so many readers find themselves on the side 
of Satan and feel that the poem’s authority figures, who step in to clear up who they’re 
supposed to be rooting for, are arguing from flimsy premises. When Fish asserts that 
“Milton’s method is to re-create in the mind of the reader (which is, finally, the poem’s 
scene) the drama of the Fall, to make him fall again exactly as Adam did” (1), he’s 
merely stating the problem with a little more precision than Blake did when he accused 
Milton of being of the Devil’s party and not knowing it.  
 As Empson points out, Milton clearly signals, using the “magnificent 
architecture” of the poem, his intention that readers see Satan as in the wrong and God as 
in the right; the problem is that his character comes alive on the page in a way Milton 
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probably didn’t foresee—and that shock of encountering a being that transcends its 
narrative functions is how readers recognize Paradise Lost as a masterpiece. Fish’s 
reading suggests that this minor miracle was completely intentional, a trick to get readers 
to experience their own sinfulness, so that Milton and God can pounce after the Fall and 
say “Gotcha!” While this idea can’t be completely ruled out, it does nothing to address 
the real dilemma Satan’s rebellion introduces: how can anyone be sure God’s authority is 
justified in the first place?  
The case against Satan rests on his alleged ambition, which is inferred from his 
raging indignation at God’s issuing of decrees all the angels must follow. “Satan desires 
to conquer God,” Flesch writes in “The Majesty of Darkness,”  
so that he can reign in God’s place: the liberty he would achieve would be for 
himself alone. His rejection of Christ’s authority comes ultimately from his sense 
that his own power is being diminished… Satan’s revolt is not against tyranny. It 
is against a tyrant whose place he wishes to usurp. (239-40) 
 
Readers of the poem, however, may not find Satan’s fear that his own power will be 
diminished by Christ’s authority as evidence of a will to dominate. Boehm quotes 
ethnographer Harold Schneider: “All men seek to rule, but if they cannot they prefer to be 
equal.” Humans recognize in themselves and in their peers a desire for authority; that, in 
itself, is not generally seen as an offense. Boehm explains, 
Even though individuals may be attracted personally to a dominant role, they 
make a common pact which says that each main political actor will give up his 
modest chances of becoming alpha in order to be certain that no one will ever be 
alpha over him. (105) 
 
Ambition is often a quality not only tolerated but admired—right up until the point at 
which ambition manifests itself in the presumed authority of the ambitious. Humans 
tolerate individuals who want to accomplish grand feats; they bristle, however, at being 
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bossed around. Satan is repeatedly accused of seeking to replace God’s tyranny with his 
own, but the way he exercises what authority he has belies this charge. Readers finish 
Paradise Lost without sufficient evidence to know one way or the other what type of 
leader Satan would make. He leads his cohort of fallen angels admirably, but it is 
possible that if he had the power God does he may give up his consensus-seeking mode 
of leadership.  
 It is the very scenes in which Satan allegedly betrays his lust for power that he in 
fact does the most to represent himself as a worthy leader. “A cardinal act of political 
deviance,” Boehm observes, “is to attempt to set oneself above another person in a way 
that is belittling, or, worse, to try to give direct orders to one’s peers” (74). While Satan 
does indeed set himself above his peers, the fallen angels in hell, he does not presume any 
ultimate authority. Sitting on his “unenvied throne / Yielded with full consent” in 
Pandemonium, he asks them all, 
     …who here 
 Will envy whom the highest place exposes 
 Foremost to stand against the Thund’rer’s aim, 
 Your bulwark, and condemns to greatest share 
 Of endless pain? (2.26-30) 
This question accomplishes two things: it justifies Satan’s status by pointing out that he is 
the most willing to take on the burdens of leadership, a willingness he’ll prove shortly by 
volunteering to embark on the risky journey to explore Earth, and it allows all the 
gathered angels an opportunity to object to him taking a leadership role. That no one 
challenges his claim that his status has been yielded with full consent vindicates him.  
 God commits the “cardinal act of political deviance” whenever his issues direct 
orders or decrees, as he does regarding the angels’ subservience to the Son. Satan may 
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aspire to godhead or leadership, but he’s much more subtle in his exercise of power. As 
Boehm explains,  
The foragers’ dilemma is to make use of the wisest heads available, yet prevent 
these gifted people from gaining undue political influence or power. One 
preventive measure is to keep the authority to decide with the group as a whole, 
and consensus-seeking does just that (76).  
 
Immediately after taking his seat on the highest throne in hell, Satan calls the fallen 
angels together so they can collectively determine what their best course of action is.  
 With this advantage then 
 To union and firm faith and firm accord, 
 More than can be in Heav’n, we now return 
 To claim our just inheritance of old, 
 Surer to prosper than prosperity 
 Could have assured us, and by what best way— 
 Whether open war or covert guile— 
 We now debate. Who can advise may speak. (2.35-42) 
The scene from Book Five Flesh quotes as evidence that Satan’s resistance to God’s 
decree is justified features yet another counsel he’s called to decide on a course of action. 
Milton felt compelled to insist before relaying Satan’s speech that it’s full of deception—
Satan has already decided how to respond to God’s decree—suggesting that he 
“Pretending so commanded to consult” (5.768). That he already has a plan in mind, 
however, doesn’t really constitute an offense—as long as he gives everyone a fair chance 
to be heard and gets them all on board before making the decision final.  
 Satan even engages in a debate with Abdiel as the counsel continues, proving that 
he is indeed sincere in his stated purpose to give everyone a chance to speak. In fact, the 
critics like Flesch who accuse Satan of wanting to replace God in a position of authority 
are simply following Abdiel, who says to Satan that his challenge is “Expected, least of 
all from thee, ingrate, / In place thyself so high above thy peers!” (5.811-12) The 
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contradiction these critics see in Satan resisting God’s authority while at the same time 
exercising his own authority to marshal the rebel angels’ forces—assuming leadership to 
challenge leadership—isn’t really as logically inconsistent as they make out. Boehm 
quotes the anthropologist Richard Lee: 
Egalitarianism is not simply the absence of a headman or other authority figures, 
but a positive insistence on the essential equality of all people and a refusal to 
bow to the authority of others, a sentiment expressed in the statement: “Of course 
we have headmen… each of us is headman over himself.” Leaders do exist, but 
their influence is subtle and indirect. They never order or make demands of 
others, and their accumulation of material goods is never more, and often much 
less, than the average accumulation of the other households in their camp. (Lee 
457 qtd. in Boehm 61) 
 
Boehm refers to leaders in egalitarian bands as serving the role of primus inter pares—
first among equals. Again, the main difference between a legitimate leader and a tyrant is 
that the former leads by persuasion and consensus, thus protecting the autonomy of each 
political actor, while the latter issues direct orders and enforces them with physical 
threats.  
 There are several stirring instances in Paradise Lost that show God to be a tyrant 
and Satan to be a primus inter pares, but perhaps the most apposite in this context is the 
exchange between Abdiel and Satan that takes place as the battle in heaven is about to 
ensue. Abdiel shouts 
  … Fool! Not to think how vain 
 Against th’ Omnipotent to rise in arms 
 Who out of smallest things could without end 
 Have raised incessant armies to defeat 
 Thy folly or with solitary hand, 
 Reaching beyond all limit, at one blow 
 Unaided could have finished thee and whelmed 
 Thy legions under darkness! (6.135-37) 
It’s easy to see how this kind of power threatens the freedom of everyone subject to it. 
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God has, in fact, promised to enforce his decree in the way Abdiel refers to here.  
      
Him who disobeys 
Me disobeys, breaks union, and that day, 
 Cast out from God and blessed vision, falls 
 Into utter darkness, deep engulfed, his place 
 Ordained without redemption, without end. (5.611-15) 
Satan’s response to Abdiel characteristically shows that his resistance is principled and 
that the force of his message is difficult to resist. 
 Ill for thee, but in wished hour 
 Of my revenge first sought, seditious angel, to receive 
 Thy merited reward, the first assay 
 Of this right hand provoked since first that tongue 
 Inspired with contradiction durst oppose 
 A third part of the gods in synod met 
 Their deities to assert who while they feel 
 Vigor divine within them can allow 
 Omnipotence to none! (6.150-59) 
 Even what is conventionally taken as incontrovertible evidence of Satan’s 
degradation, which may also be seen as an act of malice that undermines the theory of 
bad boys as altruists, his temptation of Eve, is so complicated it requires a great deal of 
Milton’s editorializing lest it be considered something else. Satan does lie to convince 
Eve to taste the forbidden fruit; he enters the body of a serpent and tells her, as the 
serpent, the reason he’s able to speak is that he ate of the tree himself. This strategy, 
however, relies on him recognizing her lowly political status, which allows him to tempt 
her by arguing that she has a right to aspire higher.  
 Why then was this forbid? Why but to awe, 
 Why but to keep ye low and ignorant, 
 His worshippers? He knows that in the day 
 Ye eat thereof your eyes, that seem so clear 
 Yet are but dim, shall perfectly be then 
 Opened and cleared and ye shall be as gods 
 Knowing both good and evil as they know. (9.703-9) 
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He proceeds to make a point similar to the one he made earlier to Abdiel about having to 
take God’s word for where all the angels came from: 
 And what are gods that Man may not become 
 As they, participating godlike food? 
 The gods are first and that advantage use 
 On our belief that all from them proceeds. 
 I question it, for this fair earth I see 
 Warmed by the sun producing every kind, 
 Them nothing. If they all things, who enclosed 
 Knowledge of good and evil in this tree 
 That whoso eats thereof forthwith attains 
 Wisdom without their leave? And wherein lies 
 Th’ offence that Man should thus attain to know? 
 What can your knowledge hurt Him or this tree 
 Impart against his will if all be His? (9.716-26) 
There are obvious deceptions in this argument. Satan knows that God created the earth. 
He also seems to be nudging Eve toward a belief in polytheism, since he keeps referring 
to gods instead of God. Satan does not, however, know why God proscribed eating from 
the tree any more than Eve does. God never explained it; he simply said they shouldn’t 
do it, lest they die. It was another example of his rule by decree.  
Satan makes a completely valid point, moreover, in finding it suspicious that God 
would forbid them to eat of this particular tree, the Tree of Knowledge. God later 
compounds this suspicion when he responds to Man’s supposed fall by saying to the 
angels, “O sons! like one of us Man is become” (11.84). He undermines himself still 
further when he explains why Adam and Eve must be cast out of Paradise. 
Lest therefore his now bolder hand 
Reach also of the Tree of Life and eat 
And live for ever, dream at least to live 
For ever, to remove him I decree 
And send him from the garden forth. (11.93-97) 
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That “dream at least to live for ever” makes no sense because their dreaming could pose 
no danger. That he would slip the little correction into his explanation must have made 
readers through the generations wonder even more—why is God so worried about Adam 
and Eve being like the angels and living forever? This odd speech also reveals that God 
has yet to learn his lesson about those damned decrees of his. As Tyler Durden says at the 
end of Fight Club, “You can’t teach God anything” (207).  
 Milton, however, clearly sees Satan’s act of temptation as malicious, and he 
wanted readers to see it that way too. When Satan first arrives on Earth and sees Adam 
and Eve, he actually has intense doubts about going through with his plan, and in the 
ensuing monologue seems to admit that he’s letting his ambition supersede his empathy.  
 And should I at your harmless innocence 
 Melt, as I do, yet public reason just, 
 Honor and empire with revenge enlarged 
 By conquering this new world compels me now 
 To do what else, though damned, I should abhor. (4.387-92) 
What he’s talking about here, though, is visiting on them the suffering he himself is 
experiencing as a result of his rebellion, which needless to say he believes is just.  
  League with you I seek 
 And mutual amity so strait, so close, 
 That I with you must dwell or you with me 
 Henceforth. (4.375-9) 
Satan’s great act of malice is to make an argument tinged with deception—but an 
argument that happens to be valid. The offense then boils down to his tricking Eve into 
believing a snake learned to talk by eating the forbidden fruit and not letting on that he in 
fact knew God was singular and created earth. In return, readers might conclude, he 
offers her a glimpse at the true nature of her position in relation to her husband and in 
relation to the angels—and in relation to God. If he’d had the luxury of a little more time 
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to discuss the matter with her, he may have been able to persuade Eve to join his 
rebellion without the deceptions, as he did a third of the angels in heaven. 
The complexity of Satan’s intentions comes through as well when he first hears 
about the “One fatal Tree.” Speaking to himself, he adumbrates the argument he’ll later 
make to Eve, suggesting that his take on the subject is honest. “Knowledge forbidden?” 
he asks. “Suspicious, reasonless. Why should their Lord / envy them that? Can it be sin to 
know” (4.515-17). He then, however, goes on to say, 
…Hence I will excite their minds 
With more desire to know and to reject 
Envious commands invented with design 
To keep them low whom knowledge might exalt 
Equal with gods. Aspiring to be such, 
They taste and die: what likelier can ensue? (4.522-27) 
 
In the scene just before he goes through with this design, he admits his plan is to harm 
Adam and Eve. Having returned to the garden where he is momentarily overcome with 
despair, he says, 
 But neither here seek I, no, nor in Heav’n 
 To dwell (unless by mast’ring Heav’n’s Supreme), 
 Nor hope to be myself less miserable 
 By what I seek but others to make such 
 As I, though thereby worse to me redound. (9.124-128) 
 
He makes this reminder to himself shortly before the scene in which he hesitates to go 
through with his plan that made Empson feel a final twinge of sympathy for him. It 
demonstrates two things: the first is that Satan is ambivalent, something readers see 
ample evidence of throughout the poem. The second is that Satan’s goal is not to harm 
Adam and Eve, but to punish God, and that he is willing suffer infinitely to do so. Even 
God recognizes Satan’s costly signal of moral indignation; addressing the Son, he says, 
    …seest thou what rage 
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 Transports our Adversary whom no bounds 
 Prescribed, no bars of Hell nor all the chains 
 Heaped on him there nor yet the main abyss 
 Wide interrupt can hold, so bent he seems 
 On desperate revenge that shall redound 
 Upon his own rebellious head? (3.80-86) 
The two psychological insights that Empson and the romantic poets intuited and came so 
close to articulating that allow Satan to break free from the magnificent architecture of 
the trap Milton set for him are, first, that Satan speaks for nearly all of humanity when he 
insists rule by decree is unjust, and, two, that the argument about Satan being ambitious 
or about his resistance to God’s authority being based on his own selfish desire for power 
is belied, again and again, by the sacrifices Satan willingly, even eagerly, makes for the 
sake of his rebellion.  
Just like a second player who vetoes an unfair proposal in the Ultimatum Game, 
Satan incurs the cost of signaling his disapproval to God—and by incurring that cost, 
which in its infinite duration is worse than death, he is simultaneously proving his 
altruism and winning over readers. His only offense, moreover, is not an act of violence 
or theft but of persuasion. Ultimately, though he suffers God’s infinite punishment in the 
poem, in at least some readers’ minds he is vindicated while God just seems vindictive. 
One final point about Satan’s appealing charisma can be gleaned from the 
observation that the inability to conceal emotions functions as a costly signal. Empson 
was probably far from alone in being moved by Satan’s capacity to be stopped in his 
tracks by the sight of Eve. 
 … Her heavenly form 
Angelic but more soft and feminine, 
Her graceful innocence, her every air 
Of gesture or least action overawed 
His malice and with rapine sweet bereaved 
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His fierceness of the fierce intent it brought. 
That space the evil one abstracted stood 
From his own evil and for the time remained 
Stupidly good, of enmity disarmed, 
Of guile, of hate, of envy, of revenge. 
 
In an earlier scene, angels patrolling earth recognize Satan because his fallen state renders 
his emotions impossible for him to conceal, his supernatural ability to disguise himself 
notwithstanding. In this scene, too, picturing his expression is a task whose ease borders 
on the automatic. He doesn’t stand stupid for long though. 
 But the hot Hell that always in him burns, 
 Though in mid-Heav’n, soon ended his delight 
 And tortures him now more the more he sees 
 Of pleasure not for him ordained. (9.457-70) 
That Satan’s mission results in such inner turmoil, and turmoil that he’s incapable of 
disguising even when he knows it’ll get him into trouble, stands as proof that he’s not a 
purely rational or selfish actor—he’s forsaken heaven and he’s undeniably suffering for 
it—and thus makes him all the more sympathetic, all the more heroic. “Being known 
through hard-to-fake or costly or honest signaling,” Flesch explains in Comeuppance, 
to have the emotional propensity to act against our own rational interests helps 
those who receive our signals to solve the problem of whether they can trust us. 
Blushing, weeping, flushing with rage, going livid with shock: all these are 
reliable signals, not only of how we feel in a certain situation but of the fact that 
we generally emit reliable signals. It pays to be fathomable. People tend to trust 
those who blush easily. (106) 
 
 Satan’s ambivalence also further proves that his anger is not borne of any 
calculated strategy to maximize his own power or acquire the maximum amount of 
amenities. On his mission of exploration to earth, Satan agonizes over what he’s done and 
questions his continued adamancy in seeking revenge. He says of God, 
  … He deserved no such return  
 From me, whom He created what I was 
34 
 
 In that bright eminence and with His good 
 Upbraided none. Nor was his service hard: 
 What could be less than to afford Him praise,  
 The easiest recompense, and pay Him thanks? 
 How due! Yet all His good proved ill in me 
 And wrought but malice. (4.42-9) 
 
Satan realizes that if he could just tolerate his subservient role his existence would be 
pleasant and he could escape from all the strife that is tormenting him. He goes on to 
consider what might happen if he were to seek rapprochement with God—but he knows 
himself well enough to foresee that once back in heaven he’ll start chaffing under God’s 
authoritarian decrees again. 
  … Therefore as far 
 From granting He as I from begging peace. 
 All hope excluded thus, behold instead 
 Of us outcast, exiled, His new delight: 
 Mankind created and for him this world. 
 So farewell hope and with hope farewell fear! 
 Farewell remorse! All good to me is lost. 
 Evil, be thou my good. (4.103-110) 
 
He simply will not be bought off; he instead sets his sights on earth where he will attempt 
to win Eve over to his cause. Satan’s ambivalence not only underscores the costliness of 
his punishment; it is also a reaction to authority nearly everyone human will sympathize 
with, regardless of whether they’re nomadic foragers or modern democrats. As Boehm 
explains,  
But as human political groups become larger and more hierarchical, the 
psychological ambivalences of individual actors become more complicated. In 
addition to the triadic pull between dominance, resentment of domination, and 
submission, other factors enter the picture: for example, tendencies to resent 
control from above may be heavily tempered by appreciation of what a 
benevolent dominating leader does for one, as in chiefdoms or primitive 
kingdoms or modern democracies where largesse is redistributed from the 
political center. Or one may identify with a powerful leader on a chauvinistic 
basis, as he (or she) tries to advance the political advantage of one’s nation. Or 
one may simply be captivated by a leader with powerful charisma. (242)  
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In Paradise Lost, though, it seems that while all the power resides with God, God simply 
can’t compete with Satan when it comes to charisma, as Henry Townsend, in Edward 
Jones’s The Known World, saw demonstrated in the anti-hero’s paean to egalitarianism in 
Hell: 
 What matter where, if I still be the same 
 And what I should be: all but less than He 
 Whom thunder hath made greater? Here at least 
 We shall be free. Th’ Almighty hath not built 
 Here for His envy, will not drive us hence. 
 Here we may reign secure, and in my choice 
 To reign is worth ambition, though in Hell: 
 Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven! (1.256-63) 
 
As the next section will explore, Tyler Durden, in Chuck Palahniuk’s 1996 novel Fight 
Club, makes a similar bargain—exchanging an IKEA-furnished condo for a rotted-out 
house and routine beatings, all for the sake of freedom and as a signal of altruistic 
punishment.  
Part 2 
Tough Love à la Tyler Durden 
 Fight Club is one of the rare books that garner more interesting commentary on 
Amazon than in the pages of loftier publications like Salon.com or the New Yorker. In a 
2000 review, someone with the handle Thrash Jazz Assassin insightfully labels the novel 
“Auto-cannibalizing satire.” “In the end,” he (or she) writes, “whether you find yourself 
offended or somehow even identifying with the characters—if you aren’t also laughing at 
yourself and your own reaction then you have… missed something.” The story and its 
characters, foremost among them the gleaming anti-hero Tyler Durden, polarize 
audiences and critics alike. Still, Amazon has the novel ranked as 21st in its list of movie 
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tie-ins, and 25th in the category of Men’s Adventure. 737 readers have felt compelled to 
voice their opinions, 646 of them giving it four or five stars. (Thrash Jazz Assassin only 
gave it three because he felt the movie was much better than the book.)  
 In what would turn out to be an opening salvo in the academic controversy over 
the story’s artistic merits—or lack thereof—Henry Giroux, in his book Public Spaces, 
Private Lives: Beyond the Culture of Cynicism, faults Fight Club simultaneously for 
representing what it’s meant to satirize and for failing to come up with any solutions for 
the issues of helplessness and alienation it attempts to take on. He writes that it is 
a morally bankrupt and politically reactionary film. Representations of violence, 
masculinity, and gender in Fight Club seem all too willing to mirror the pathology 
of individual and institutional violence that informs the American landscape, 
extending from all manner of hate crimes to the far right’s celebration of 
paramilitary and protofascist subcultures. (71) 
 
Thrash Jazz Assassin might point out that it is Giroux himself who is the reactionary 
because he takes the film—and probably himself—far too seriously. Most of the criticism 
of both Chuck Palahniuk’s book and David Fincher’s movie falls flat because it focuses 
on the story at the level of its social commentary, completely ignoring how it functions—
or malfunctions—as a narrative and how its characters behave and develop. Love it or 
hate it, Fight Club strikes a chord. More interesting by far than the question of what the 
novel or the movie are trying to say about capitalism—or about gender, or about 
violence—is the question of how the characters manage to get under so many people’s 
skin, in both pleasing and not so pleasing ways. 
 One critic who appreciates the self-cannibalizing nature of Fight Club’s satire is 
Jesse Kavadlo, who fittingly looks at the story from the perspective of existentialist 
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philosophy, and who accuses Palahniuk of being a “Closet Moralist.”  In discussing the 
author’s continuing appeal, Kavadlo simultaneously reveals his own fandom: 
Palahniuk’s following remains strong, particularly among young men, a 
demographic widely known to the publishing world for its reluctance to read. This 
appeal is unsurprising: combining violent surrealism, suspenseful noir, and 
psychological and narrative twists, the novels depict middling men who find 
themselves raging against political, economic, and social systems… His books’ 
manic charm transcends a core readership of disaffected young men galvanized 
by the books’ stylish nihilism, violent chic, or tongue in cheek contravention. (4) 
 
Kavadlo is no apologist for Tyler Durden though. In an uncanny echo of the debate 
among generations of readers over Milton’s depiction of Satan, Kavadlo expresses 
concern over the popular embrace of Palahniuk’s anti-hero. “Giroux’s reading is 
understandable,” he concedes, 
Fight Club dares its readers to take Tyler—and his reactionary politics—at face 
value. But in addition to rescuing Palahniuk from his detractors, he needs rescuing 
from his admirers. More unsettling than Giroux’s academic denunciation is the 
popular readership that identifies too strongly with Tyler Durden. (11) 
 
If it is indeed the case that audiences are intended to be turned off by Tyler at some point 
in the unfolding of the narrative, what prevents so many of them—Thrash Jazz Assassin 
notwithstanding—from doing so?  
 At the heart of Fight Club is a moral dilemma faced by the narrator (who is 
conventionally referred to as Jack following the practice established by the film’s script). 
The entire narrative focuses on Jack’s handling of this dilemma, and yet critics, if they 
mention it at all, gloss over it as they try to work out its relation to some overall message. 
Even critics as insightful as Kavadlo simply try to translate or decode the dilemma, or to 
place it in the context of anti-consumerism, or economic alienation, or Jack’s gender 
identity crisis. At the beginning of the plot, Jack is paralyzed by feelings of guilt, and he 
seeks to anesthetize himself by embracing nihilism and fatalism even more than 
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consumerism. Then Marla Singer shows up. Edward Norton, the actor who portrays Jack 
in the film, compares Fight Club to The Graduate in the promotional materials. Indeed, 
over the course of the plot, Jack learns to man up, as it were, and begins taking 
responsibility for his actions. It’s not so much that Marla inspires him to grow up so he 
can be worthy of her; it’s rather that she makes him realize his nihilism and fatalism are a 
flimsy act—a lie. He can’t convincingly claim to be moribund as he thrills to her “Italian 
dark leather sofa lips” (36). So, he has to come up with another solution to his dilemma. 
That’s where Tyler Durden comes into to the story.  
 The story begins at the end, with Jack and Tyler atop the Parker-Morris Building 
waiting for the bombs that will demolish it to detonate. Tyler has a gun stuck in Jack’s 
mouth, and this is where the flashback begins. “I know all this,” Jack says, “the gun, the 
anarchy, the explosion is really about Marla Singer” (14). Jack meets Marla at a meeting 
of a support group for men with testicular cancer. The point of the support group is to 
give members the opportunity to cry, which Jack gets in the habit of doing. “Crying is 
right at hand in the smothering dark,” he says, describing the experience of being 
embraced by Bob, a man whose hormonal imbalance has led to the formation of “bitch 
tits,” “closed inside someone else, when you see how everything you can ever 
accomplish will end up as trash./ Anything you’re ever proud of will be thrown away” 
(17). The shocking thing about this scene is that Jack finds this proof of life’s futility 
appealing. He likes the support group. In fact, he attends the meetings for several others, 
even though he doesn’t have testicular cancer or any of the other illnesses the groups are 
meant to help their members cope with. Jack is addicted to support groups. He explains, 
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“This is when I’d cry because right now, your life comes down to nothing, and not even 
nothing, oblivion” (17).  Why would Jack think oblivion is a good thing? 
 The immediate answer is made clear when Jack reveals, “This is as close as I’ve 
been to sleeping in almost two weeks” (17). Indeed, Jack attended his first support group 
meeting at the sarcastic behest of his doctor, whom he’d sought out for a treatment for his 
insomnia. After three weeks without sleep, Jack pleads with the doctor to give him some 
pills, insisting that he’s in pain. “My doctor said, if I wanted to see real pain, I should 
swing by First Eucharist on a Tuesday night” (19). Jack does just that. The reason the 
doctor refused to write a prescription, though, is telling: “My doctor said, ‘Insomnia is 
just the symptom of something larger. Find out what’s actually wrong’” (19). Many 
critics see this as an invitation to treat the story as a Rorschach and launch into 
declamations of how society or capitalism or gender politics are to blame, but Palahniuk 
actually provides ample evidence for determining what Jack’s real problem is. That 
problem, moreover, is much more specific, and much less abstract than even critics like 
Kavadlo recognize.      
 To be fair, Palahniuk endows his narrator with a great deal of caginess with 
regard to what’s really bothering him. Jack sneaks the revelation—or splices it—into his 
discussion of traveling for his job and of Tyler’s habit of splicing pornography into 
family movies as he works as a projectionist. “Wherever I’m going,” Jacks explains, 
I’ll be there to apply the formula. I’ll keep the secret intact.  
It’s simple arithmetic.  
It’s a story problem.  
If a new car built by my company leaves Chicago traveling west at 60 miles per 
hour, and the rear differential locks up, and the car crashes and burns with 
everyone trapped inside, does my company initiate a recall?  
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You take the population of vehicles in the field (A) and multiply it by the 
probable rate of failure (B), then multiply the result by the average cost of out-of-
court settlement (C).  
A times B times C equals X. This is what it will cost if we don’t initiate a recall. 
If X is greater than the cost of a recall, we recall the cars and no one gets hurt.  
If X is less than the cost of a recall, then we don’t recall. (30) 
 
Jack can’t sleep at night because he has a furiously guilty conscious. It’s easy to imagine 
a family member of one of those people who burned to death when the rear differential of 
their car locked up confronting him, raging, teary-eyed, asking, “How do you sleep at 
night?”  
The question now becomes, why does Jack continue going to work? Palahniuk 
provides readers with a clear answer to this question as well. Jack admits to being a 
“slave to my nesting instinct.” He’s not alone: “The people I know who used to sit in the 
bathroom with pornography, now they sit in the bathroom with their IKEA furniture 
catalogue” (43). His IKEA collection isn’t merely an abstract symbol of consumerism. 
Palahniuk employs a great deal more ingenuity than that. Jack’s consumer goods are the 
stakes he wins from his immoral exchange. His dilemma is completely understandable in 
terms of even the most mundane moral reasoning. Kids just a few years older than the 
infants in Karen Wynn and Kiley Hamlin’s experiments would probably be quite capable 
of understanding that Jack is profiting from the exploitation of other people who are 
being harmed. In game theory terms, Jack is both a first-order free-rider, because he’s 
taking a cut of the gains, and a second-order free-rider, because he lets his boss get away 
with keeping the policies in place. “I know where all the skeletons are,” Jack says. 
“Consider it my job security” (31).  
The psychological hold the narrative has on readers at this point derives from 
Jack’s signals of remorse. If he were a purely rational and selfish actor, the way he earned 
41 
 
his livelihood would cost him no sleep. Already, though, Jack is, as it were, beating 
himself up—a practice he’ll engage in literally later in the story. Recognizing his 
insomnia harkens to his guilt also solves the mystery of why attending support group 
meetings helps him sleep. Upon hearing the news that Chloe, a woman afflicted with a 
brain parasite, “finally died,” Jack responds, 
Oh, this should be so sweet. For two years, Chloe’s been crying in my arms 
during hug time, and now she’s dead, dead in the ground, dead in an urn, 
mausoleum, columbarium. Oh, the proof that one day you’re thinking and hauling 
yourself around, and the next, you’re cold fertilizer, worm buffet. This is the 
amazing miracle of death, and should be so sweet if weren’t for, oh, that one.  
Marla. (35) 
 
Jack can wallow in the pointless futility of life, and even allow himself to be exonerated 
by it—after all, as screenwriter Jim Uhls has him repeat in the movie version in the 
middle of an explanation of his job, “On a long enough timeline, the survival rate of 
everyone drops to zero.” The support groups sound the clarion call of nihilism and 
fatalism, and they thus let Jack off the hook for the selfish and antisocial means with 
which he keeps his apartment done up in the latest IKEA styles.  
 While those who respond favorably to Milton’s Satan can be separated from those 
who come away from the poem appalled according to whether or not they feel some 
bedrock of authority is necessary for a functioning society, readers’ and viewers’ 
responses to Fight Club can be divided almost perfectly according to those who get the 
story and those on whom it’s completely lost—almost because many fans misinterpret it 
in the same way critics like Giroux do, latching on to precisely what he’s disturbed by. 
For the subset of readers who understand and sympathize with Jack’s dilemma, the story 
promises to track his efforts to deal with his guilt in some way other than trying to reject 
any and all notions of moral responsibility. One of the things that make this process 
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confusing is that following it over the course of the plot involves disentangling Jack’s 
fatalism and nihilism from Tyler’s lessons about self-destruction, which, incidentally, 
echo Satan’s pronouncements in many respects.  
Just like Satan, Tyler is a costly signaler and an altruistic punisher. One of his 
most altruistic deeds, which ironically turns out to be less obviously altruistic with the 
revelation that he and Jack are the same person, is to help Jack become a costly signaler 
and an altruistic punisher himself. The first step along this path for Jack is giving up all 
his “flaming worldly possessions,” a relinquishment Tyler forces on him when he blows 
up his apartment. The second step is fight club: “Most guys are at fight club because of 
something they’re too scared to fight. After a few fights, you’re a lot less afraid” (54). It’s 
no coincidence that the haunting presence of Jack’s boss looms over the early parts of the 
story. In the movie version, he answers Tyler’s question about whom he’d most like to 
fight, “I’d fight my boss.”  
 Aside from the difficulty of sifting the nihilism from the costly signal of self-
destruction, the other source of confusion about Fight Club comes from there being two 
overlapping plots within the story. The first centers on Jack’s attempts to come to terms 
with the culpability he fails to escape for his complicity with the car company he works 
for. To do this, he needs Tyler. Unfortunately, once Tyler has free reign for a while to 
initiate a legion of men into the grandeur of adult manhood by training them to take risks 
and suffer pain and privation for the sake of protecting their own and others’ individual 
sovereignty, he ends up going too far, getting Bob (he of the bitch tits) killed, killing 
Jack’s boss—comeuppance for all the lives he’s allowed to come to fiery ends to protect 
his company’s bottom line—and even going so far as to threaten Marla’s life. Fight 
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Club’s second plot centers on Jack’s attempts to bring another of what Christopher 
Boehm calls domination episodes to an end. However, just as generations of readers have 
failed to be convinced by the magnificent architecture of Milton’s poem that was 
designed to signal Satan’s degradation, many readers—and probably even more 
viewers—of Fight Club fail to grasp the urgency of Jack’s efforts to stop Tyler.  
 The novel and Uhls’ screenplay diverge in some interesting ways. The film does a 
much better job indulging the audience’s desire to see Jack’s boss get his comeuppance. 
It also portrays Jack’s own punishment—at the hands of Tyler, but with his grudging 
consent—much more clearly. On the other hand, the necessity of reigning Tyler in at the 
end is much more difficult to appreciate in the movie than in the novel because he never 
kills anyone; he only vaguely threatens Marla. Tyler, played by Hollywood star Brad Pitt, 
thus becomes all the more difficult to discern from other bad boy characters in movies 
who make audiences constantly wonder what they’ll do next while never really believing 
they’re quite capable of true malice. Whereas in the novel, only a page in, readers find 
out the space monkeys in the Parker-Morris Building are sending office furniture and 
equipment through the windows several floors up and watching them “disappearing into 
the packed crowd” (12), the movie has Pitt’s Tyler assure Jack all the people have been 
cleared out of the building: “We’re not killing anyone man—we’re setting them free.”  
 The scene in the movie that has Jack finally standing up to his boss is a wonderful 
illustration of how costly or altruistic punishment works. Before he’s ready for this 
display, however, he has to assimilate more of Tyler’s teachings about self-destruction. 
Soon after Tyler starts up a relationship with Marla—after he’s gone to her apartment, 
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ironically, to prevent her from committing suicide—he introduces Jack to the history of 
soap and, simultaneously, the importance of sacrifice. 
Tyler says I’m nowhere near hitting bottom, yet. And if I don’t fall all the way, I 
can’t be saved. Jesus did it with his crucifixion thing. I shouldn’t just abandon 
money and property and knowledge. This isn’t just a weekend retreat. I should 
run from self-improvement, and I should be running toward disaster. I can’t just 
play it safe anymore. (70) 
 
In the midst of their joint soap-making enterprise, Tyler takes time out to give Jack a big 
wet kiss on the hand. He then pours lye on spot he’s thus covered with saliva. “This is a 
chemical burn,” he says, “and it will hurt worse than you’ve ever been burned” (73).  
Tyler recounts the history of how soap was discovered as Jack writhes in pain. Over 
hundreds of years, humans were burned alive as sacrifices. The ashes mixed with rain 
and, seeping into a nearby river, turned to lye. People soon realized their clothes got 
clearer if they washed them at that spot along the river. “It was right to kill all those 
people” (77), Tyler insists. “Someday,” he says to Jack, “you will die, and until you know 
that, you’re useless to me” (76). The soap they create at their ersatz factory, using fat they 
steal from the waste bins of a liposuction clinic, is of course also a perfect, Swiftian 
symbol for the blithe and oblivious way people make deals similar to the one Jack made 
with the car company every time they buy products without the least concern for their 
provenance.  
 Though in the novel Jack simply wakes up at his office desk, smells gasoline on 
his hands, and learns later that Tyler has poured the gas into a hole drilled into his boss’s 
computer’s cathode ray tube, causing it to explode when he turns it on, the scene in the 
film that shows Jack’s boss getting his comeuppance does more to direct the audience’s 
45 
 
attention to the offenses that make the punishment necessary. “Let’s pretend,” Jack 
enjoins his boss as he addresses him over his desk, 
you’re the department of transportation, ok. Someone informs you that this 
company installs front seat mounting brackets that never pass collision tests, 
brake linings that fail after a thousand miles, and fuel injectors that explode and 
burn people alive. What then? 
 
Jack proposes his boss keep paying his regular salary, even though he’ll no longer be 
coming into work, in exchange for his silence. This exchange may not seem any less 
selfish than his original arrangement, but Jack doesn’t keep the money. He gloats, after 
triumphing in the negotiation, “We now had corporate sponsorship. This is how Tyler 
and I were able to have fight club every night of the week.” It’s also how they’re able to 
start up Project Mayhem, a campaign intended at least in part to redress wrongs against 
unsuspecting consumers of the sort perpetrated by the car company.  
 When Jack first makes the threat, though, his boss assumes he’s bluffing. The 
threat lacks credibility because by exposing the company’s crimes Jack would be 
simultaneously revealing his own complicity. A rational actor, therefore, would never 
make good on the threat—just as a rational actor would never veto a cut of any size in the 
Ultimatum Game. Jack has to give his boss a costly signal of his ability and willingness 
to be irrational (and game theorists would call his display rational irrationality). So, he 
proceeds to punch himself in the face, throw himself atop a glass coffee table, shattering 
it—“That hurt,” he says casually—pick himself up, and throw himself into a glass 
credenza. His boss, dropping the phone he picked up to call security, watches in shock. 
Jack explains in voiceover narration, “Under and behind and inside everything this man 
took for granted, something horrible had been growing.” The camera lights on business 
cards, then on a nameplate, and then on the phone. This series of images resonates with 
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the earlier inventory of household kitsch Jack had purchased from IKEA. The scene is a 
wonderful illustration of Tyler’s principle of self-destruction as liberation. It’s also a 
wonderful illustration of altruistic punishment, since the cost incurred by the punisher is a 
pure signal of disapproval, so pure in fact that Jack’s boss is never physically harmed.  
 After confronting his boss, Jack is no longer a second-order free-rider, but he still 
got away with living off of his ill-gotten gains for years before Tyler came around. He’s 
therefore due for some punishment for his own first-order free-riding. The novel has Jack 
leaving work with the smell of gasoline still on his hands and getting into a car driven by 
a man referred to as the mechanic, who serves as a mouthpiece for Tyler. Crossing the 
center line of a highway and directing the car into oncoming traffic, the mechanic asks 
Jack and some space monkeys—fight club veterans who’ve become foot soldiers for 
Project Mayhem—what they will wish they’d done before they died. “My job,” Jack 
responds, “I wish I’d quit my job” (144). The mechanic returns back to proper lane, but 
then he crosses back again, this time saying, “What will you wish you’d done before you 
died?” (145). This time Jack answers, “My wish right now is for me to die. I am nothing 
in the world compared to Tyler” (146)—who, unlike in the film version, is responsible 
for punishing Jack’s boss, by killing him. Jack grabs the steering wheel and wrestles with 
the mechanic, who tries to steer them back to safety. The mechanic ends up knocking him 
unconscious—“I almost broke the steering wheel with your head” (147)—and narrowly 
saving them. The film version has Tyler crashing them into a car parked on the shoulder 
and then rolling into a ditch. “I’d never been in a car accident. This must’ve been what all 
those people felt like before I filed them as statistics in my reports,” Jack narrates. Pulling 
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Jack from the wreckage, Tyler characteristically exalts, “We just had a near-life 
experience!”  
This crash scene marks the end of the first plot, as Jack soon discovers both that 
Tyler is his alternate personality and that Project Mayhem is a larger, more dangerous 
enterprise than he knew. The message of self-destruction and breaking attachments to 
material goods and physical strength, Jack realizes, can be taken too far. The problem is 
he can’t convince anyone else of this. None of the fight club members or space monkeys 
recognizes that Tyler has become a dangerous despot because he cleverly engages in 
various forms of self-effacement like Boehm describes as common among successful 
leaders in foraging societies. “The new rule is that nobody should be the center of fight 
club,” the mechanic explains to Jack. 
From now on, when a leader starts a fight club, when everyone is standing around 
the light in the center of the basement, waiting, the leader should walk around and 
around the outside edge of the crowd, in the dark. (142) 
 
Tyler also cunningly ups the ante for each of the missions he sends the space 
monkeys on. “Every time we do these little homework assignments,” he explains, “these 
fight club men with nothing to lose are a little more invested in Project Mayhem” (167). 
After Bob gets killed on one of these homework assignments and Jack realizes it’s all 
getting way out of hand, he tries to do something about it: 
I go to a fight club tonight to shut it down. I stand in the one light at the center of 
the room, and the club cheers. To everyone here, I’m Tyler Durden. Smart. 
Forceful. Gutsy. I hold up my hands for silence, and I suggest, why don’t we all 
just call it a night. Go home, tonight, and forget about fight club.  
I think fight club has served its purpose, don’t you?  
Project Mayhem is cancelled… 
A man is dead, I say. This game is over. It’s not for fun anymore. (178) 
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The crowd’s response is simply to ignore him—the typical response among nomadic 
foragers to a leader who issues direct orders—and begin the ritual recitation of the rules 
of fight club. When it’s time for the first two men to fight and Jack doesn’t leave, they 
hoist him up and body-surf him to the door. He protests, “But I’m Tyler Durden. I 
invented fight club. Fight club is mine. I wrote those rules. None of you would be here if 
it wasn’t for me. And I say it stops here!” (179) All of his statements are self-
undermining, and they only serve to solidify Tyler’s authority because everyone is 
convinced they’re actually a divesting of authority. He’s trained them for this response by 
toggling back and forth between personalities, and they’ve learned not to take Jack 
seriously. At one point, Tyler even gives the space monkeys the assignment of castrating 
Jack. “You’re a brave man,” one of them says, “to make yourself a homework 
assignment.” “I really admire what you’re doing” (187), he says. The self-destructive 
nature of Tyler’s message, and of Tyler himself, makes them irrefutable.  
 Though the space monkeys don’t go through with the castration assignment—in 
the film, Jack escapes—Tyler does go on to give Marla a black eye, and he kills a second 
person. “You shot the mayor’s special envoy on recycling!” (196) Marla informs Jack. 
Tyler commits no murders in the film version, and he never strikes Marla—again, he only 
vaguely threatens her, suggesting, “She knows too much.” Then again, he’s also the one 
who saved her life when she tried to kill herself. Consequently, it’s almost 
understandable that so many of the fans of the movie failed to catch on to the danger and 
absurdity of Tyler’s mission—though one would hope the vast majority of them came to 
their senses when they absorbed their first punch to the face while trying to emulate him. 
In both the movie and the novel, though, Jack realizes the only way to finally stop Tyler 
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is to beat him at his own game of self-destruction. Atop the Parker-Morris Building, he 
takes the gun of his own accord, replaces it in his mouth, and pulls the trigger. Just as 
Thrash Jazz Assassin points out, though, the theme of self-destruction itself must also be 
made to seem absurd, and so Jack doesn’t end up dying. “The bullet out of Tyler’s gun, it 
tore out my other cheek to give me a jagged smile from ear to ear. Yeah, just like an 
angry Halloween pumpkin. Japanese demon. Dragon of Avarice” (207).  
 Fittingly, the final pages of Fight Club feature an exchange between Jack or Tyler 
and God, who as part of his hospital dream asks why he caused so much pain. “Didn’t I 
realize that each of us is a sacred, unique snowflake of special unique specialness?”  
I look at God behind his desk, taking notes on a pad, but God’s got this all wrong. 
We are not special.  
We are not trash or crap, either.  
We just are.  
We just are, and what happens just happens.  
And God says, “No, that’s not right.”   
Yeah. Well. Whatever. You can’t teach God anything. (207) 
 
He’s not just repudiating God, his boss, and the IKEA culture here; he’s repudiating 
Tyler Durden too. He’s also highlighting the differences between nice guys and bad boys 
that make the latter so appealing. Nice guys cherish the approval of father-figures, like 
their bosses, because they crave reassurance. This craving makes it all the more difficult 
for them to challenge authority, even when they believe the authority figure is in the 
wrong. Bad boys get their reputations for being bad, not because they hurt people—they 
generally don’t—but because they bypass conventions and disobey orders. Being bad 
entails risks and costs, but bad boys tend to be clever and charming, and the more they 
get away with the more right it seems that they receive special dispensations. But what 
makes them truly irresistible is their willingness to forego pleasures and amenities, to 
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take on pain and misery, and completely self-destruct if necessary, in the service of 
righting injustices. It all depends on whose eyes the bad boy is seeking redemption in.  
How Tyler saw it was that getting God’s attention for being bad was better than 
getting no attention at all. Maybe God’s hate was better than his indifference… 
The lower you fall, the higher you’ll fly. The farther you run, the more God wants 
you back. (141) 
 
Kavadlo claims that “Palahniuk has pioneered a new genre, the fiction of self 
destruction” (20). He may have a point with reference to the fact that Palahniuk’s novels 
collapse in on themselves or auto-cannibalize. But self-destruction as a theme and a 
character trait is as old as the heavens.  
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